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RECENT DECISIONS

CORPORATIONS-CHANGE IN THE BASIS OF SHARING PROFITS AS AN IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CoNTRACTs-Plainti:ff, a stockholder in
defendant corporation, sought to enjoin distribution of dividends on a patronage
basis. Defendant corporation was organized under the laws of Nebraska for
the purpose of buying and selling grain, hay, and other agricultural products
with a general reservation in the charter of the right to change, alter, and
amend. The articles of incorporation were amended so as to convert the cor-
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poration into a co-operative organization distributing profits on the basis of the
amount of business done with the corporation. Held, a general reservation of
power to amend the articles did not confer on the corporation the right to
make changes which would impair. the contract rights of the llJembers. This
amendment constituted a fundamental change in the nature and purpose of the
corporation and impaired the contractural right of the plaintiff to share in the
profits. Hueftle v. Farmers Elevator, (Neb. 1944) 16 N.W. (2d) 855.
There is a wide divergence of opinion on the question of the extent to
which a reservation of power to amend articles of incorporation may be appli~d
to changing the rights of the shareholders inter se. 1 The standard most frequently applied is that a corporation may not amend its articles by less than a
unanimous vote so as t_o " . . . defeat or substantially impair the object of the
grant or any right vested under the grant. . . ." 2 The effect on vested rights
as a measure of validity has become increasingly more important than the
fundamental change concept, and in the principal case the contemplated change
does not seem to defeat the object of the grant, the buying and selling of farm
products, so much as it alters the rights of the stockholders by creating a new
basis for the distribution· of dividends. Until recent years there have not been
many instances of tampering with dividend rights, but in the last twenty years
there has developed a line of cases upholding the right of the majority to alter
preferred stockholders' share in the profits.3 It is also the rule that a shareholder has no vested right to undeclared dividends. 4 However, a stockholder
does have a right to an expectation of dividends and may bring an action in
equity to compel the declaration of a dividend where the profits warrant. 5
The right to share in deciding corporate policies through voting is held to be
1
For a discussion of the conflict see Curran, "Minority Stockholders and the
Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 M1cH. L. REv. 743 (1934); 77 UNiv. PA.
L. REv. 256 (1928).
2
Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46, 21 S. Ct. 21 (1900).
3
McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D.C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639,
permitting the removal of accrued preferred dividends under the specific wording of
the Maryland statute, Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 23, § 28. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 A. 654 (1928); Peters v. United
States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. II, II4 A. 598 (1921), where the court held that
amendments divesting future preferential dividends were valid, but that accrued
dividends could not be removed. Contra, Pronick v. Spirits Distributing Co., 58 N.J.
Eq. 97, 42 A. 586 (1899), where the court, holding invalid a direft reduction in
dividends said that the contract cannot be altered unless there is an express reservation
of power to amend the particular agreement. Tne decisions allowing changes in
dividend rates rely on the theory that the public benefit derived outweighs the
damage done by divesting private rights. In the principal case, no public benefit is
derived from the change.
4
Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647 (1930); State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nebraska State Bank of O'Neil, 123 Neb. 289, 242 N.W. 613 (1932); See also
Yoakum v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., (D.C. R.I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533. The
court says that the contractual obligation to set up a sinking fund "more fully answers
the requirements of a vested property right than does an expectancy of future payment of undeclared dividends."
5
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Stevens v.
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a vested right. 6 Even more than the right to vote,7 the primary basis of the
relationship between the shareholders in a corporation organized for profit is
the anticipation of a share in the profits. 8 There is no doubt that the apportioning of dividends on a patronage basis may result in a complete nullification of
any right to share in the profits which the stockholder may have acquired when
he purchased his stock. The usual conception of a vested right may not include the expectation of dividends,9 but the right to share in the profits is so
fundamental to the relationship between the shareholder and the corporation
that the doctrine of the Delaware cases 10 should be limited to situations where
the public interest is involved and even in such cases should not be extended to
permit the total abrogation of dividends.
Robert E. Walsh, S.Ed.

United States Steel Corp., 68 N.J. Eq. 373, 59 A. 905 (1905); Channon v. H.
Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (1920).
6
Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443 (1909);
Talbot J. Taylor & Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., (C.C. Ky. 1903) 122 F. 147.
7
Obviously the real reason the right to vote is valuable is that it enables the
stockholder to protect his investment and assure himself of continuing profits.
8
lntermountain Building & Loan Assoc. v. Gallegos, (C.C.A. 9th, 1935) 78 F.
(2d) 972, in which the court says, at 980, "The right to share in the profits of the
corporation is one of the badges of a stockholder." Jackson v. Newark Plankroad Co.,
31 N.J.L. 277 at 278 (1865), where the court says," .•. a person holding, as owner,
the stock of a corporation, becomes thereby entitled to a proportionate share in the
profits of the company. • . ." See also Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 139 Wash.
305, 246 P. 941 (1926), where the court in holding that a non-working shareholder
was entitled to a share in the profits which were being distributed as wages, said, at
311, "As a stockholder, she is entitled to a just proportion of all the earnings of the
corporation that may justly be classed as a division of the profits, whatever may be
the form adopted for their distribution."
9 In II AM. JuR., § 370, p. I 199, a vested right is defined as "an immediate or
fixed right of present or future enjoyment" and one that does not depend upon an
e,•ent that is uncertain.
10
See note 3, supra, and Keller v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 21 Del. Ch. 13, 391, 180
A. 584, 190 A. 115 (1935).

